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Recent attention has focused on the difficulties of establishing ‘coherence’ between 
humanitarian relief aid in complex emergencies and the objective of ending violent 
conflict. This paper introduces a parallel problem: absence of total synergy between 
making peace and building democracy. A widely held assumption in the international 
community is that in post-conflict situations peace-building and democratization are 
virtually synonymous; creating the conditions for the one does so for both, the two 
processes will be reciprocal and mutually supportive. This suggests the policy issues 
will be simple. But the reality could be very different. Choices have to be addressed 
between requisites for peace and conditions for democracy; over the different 
implications for peace of competing designs for democracy; and over the kind of 
‘democracy’ and its relation to other essential developments like state-building. …/ 
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Institutional crafting is important; but matters concerning civil society and political 
culture must be addressed too. Governance and welfare considerations will bear on both 
peace and democracy but not necessarily in identical ways. There are temporal choices 
to address as well; the order of passage from peace to stable democracy may be as 
significant as the rites of passage. The belief that the well-known theory of a democratic 
peace in international relations has its complement in a democratic domestic peace looks 
plausible, but ‘getting there’ after conflict will be challenging. Issues of strategy and 
policy are most problematic where peace, prosperity and democracy have all been 
deficient—a situation common to many societies. 
 
   1
1  Introduction: peace or democracy? 
From the time of the fall of the Berlin wall the international community formally 
encourages states to democratize. Democracy is proposed as a universal ideology; it 
should be the ‘only game in town’. Democracy promotion is now reckoned to account 
for around 5 per cent of all official development assistance, up from 0.5 per cent in 
1991. In a significant number of countries there is a recent history of substantial sub-
state violence of one sort or another, including civil war. Following the end of the cold 
war international actors have become increasingly drawn to intervene in these situations 
and are expected to engage in building the peace. Building peace and constructing 
democracy have come to be viewed as one: ‘democratic peace building’ sums up this 
compound agenda. It invokes the familiar ‘democratic peace’ thesis in international 
relations, which claims that inter-state peace is guaranteed between democracies. It 
conveys the idea of a democratic domestic peace: a society with an established 
democratic polity only rarely goes to war with itself. In the general discourse no 
alternative policy option to ‘democratic peace building’ is envisaged, the most likely 
alternative being a reversion back to violent conflict. 
 
The past in many of today’s democracies is of course littered with periods of violent 
civil conflict; the one does not prevent the other. In some notable instances violence 
made democracy’s advance possible: the conflict was expressly about securing precisely 
that objective. Equally there have been times when it was ruthless government action or 
external political or military intervention that ended internal violence and planting 
democracy was no part of the motive or intent. European history tells us that where 
conflict has taken the form of civil war, regression to autocracy and progress towards 
democracy have both been among the outcomes, with institutional forces, the unity and 
cohesiveness of the winners, and the opposition’s strategy being determining factors 
(Kissane and Sitter 2005). 
 
Today, the driving forces—aims, rationales and intensity of interest—of different actors 
at the national, intra-national and international levels in establishing peace in a country 
and in its democratization are unlikely to be identical. Peace and democracy serve 
different interests. Various reasons explain why peace and democracy are sought; they 
do not all coincide. Peace is valued not just because it might facilitate democracy. And 
democracy can be prized as a collective good for reasons other than the contribution it 
might make to peace. Democracy’s potential to enshrine liberty or make government 
accountable and more representative, the participatory dimension, its inclination 
towards ‘good governance’ and socially responsible economic management all make 
their own appeal irrespective of how far these qualities serve peace. Democracy may be 
an end in itself. In situations where regional stability or international security and the 
interests of international capital are at stake, the returns offered by an end to internal 
conflict and by transition to democracy are not synonymous. In the short run there   2
might be conflicting calculations, especially where state (re)building—as distinct from 
fashioning a democratic state—and economic reconstruction offer more immediate 
results, or where the peace dividend (domestic and international) that democracy is 
expected to bring in the long run is heavily discounted in the short term.  
 
Thus peacemaking and peace-building or their requisites on the one hand and 
democratization and its conditions on the other might not coincide. Tension can exist 
between the two agendas, as well as among different constituents within each agenda. 
Failed attempts at democratic peace-building in developing and post-communist 
countries alike suggest there can be opportunity costs and trade-offs where bad choices 
are possible. The several kinds of ‘democracy’ or ‘diminished forms of 
democracy’/‘democracy with adjectives’ (‘electoral democracy’, ‘partial democracy, 
‘managed democracy’ and so on), different institutional designs for democracy, and 
different time horizons for democratization may all affect peace-building differently, 
from one post-conflict-situation to another. Identical democratic choices could bear 
differently on the prospects for peace in societies with dissimilar backgrounds, such as 
those with and without a recent history of conflict. 
 
All this is made clearer by exploring the ideas of peace and democracy. On the 
evidential basis for a democratic peace in international relations, the more closely we 
investigate dissimilar forms of violence such as total war, ‘low intensity warfare’, 
sponsored political assassinations and so on, the less impressive the thesis looks. And it 
certainly sheds no light on relations between democracies and non-democracies. Indeed 
the reasons that might explain peace among democracies are more illuminating than the 
fact of peace itself: they are contested: they indicate the thesis is no iron law (indeed, 
causality might run from peace to democracy); and they need not apply in the future 
where the world’s democracies are far more diverse. Equally, ‘post-conflict’ can refer to 
a range of scenarios, not just complete and final closure; violent incidents often persist 
in some particular social arena or scattered geographical localities, as in Iraq. Similarly 
on democratic peace-building, the consequences of different democratic architectures 
and of the important distinction between stable democracy’s properties and the 
processes of democracy-building can have crucial implications for pacific outcomes. 
1.2  Democracy and the causes of conflict 
More specifically, the magnitude, duration and type of violent conflict, both its ‘causes’ 
and its impact on society—how it is understood and interpreted there—and how it was 
brought to an end can all have a bearing on whether, how and to what extent democracy 
offers a solution. Put differently, not all post-conflict societies are the same. 
 
The vast literature on causes of civil conflict leaves no single theory a clear ‘winner’. 
But absence of democracy hardly figures among the front runners. One reason is that 
violent conflicts are so diverse: state-organized pogroms and ‘democide’, inter-ethnic 
and religious strife; class wars and ideologically-motivated revolutions; wars of national   3
secession; violent struggles over economic turf (warfare as ‘business’). Some analysts 
even sub-divide civil wars, into ‘old’ (ideologically-rooted) and ‘new’ (less political). 
Each category may have to be explained differently—and require its own solution. If for 
instance the ‘cause’ is environmental scarcity, or socio-economic inequality (two 
theories that do not receive wide support in the literature), then it is not obvious how 
democracy can help. And if greed combined with opportunity to command economic 
rents, rather than grievance concerning political oppression or exclusion from power, 
carry heaviest responsibility for a civil war,1 then should political scientists be 
prescribing democracy at all, let alone pore over competing schemes for establishing 
political inclusiveness? There are democracies where government has persistently 
mismanaged the nation’s financial and economic affairs, where rapacious profit-seekers 
have wreaked havoc, and where sizeable inequalities of income and wealth only 
increased during periods of sustained economic growth. The rule of law—and secure 
property rights especially—not free and fair elections appear to be the most significant 
for wealth creation. So, although some writers might envisage a democratic 
development(al) state as the ideal instrument to produce the economic conditions for 
durable peace, in some places the economic conditions could be more likely to emerge 
and consolidate under a semi-authoritarian developmental state.  
 
On the relationship between ethnopolitics and conflict a substantial literature tells us 
ethnic diversity need not lead to violent conflict; it may not explain the majority of 
violent conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In Africa the principal exceptions appear to 
be where there is a high degree of polarization, as in Rwanda and Burundi. Collier and 
Hoeffler calculate that polarized societies have around a 50 per cent higher probability 
of civil war than either homogenous or highly fractionalized societies; Byman and 
Evera claimed that of 37 countries experiencing conflict after 1989 a hegemonistic 
ethnic group accounted in part for 25 of the cases. (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 572; Byma 
and van Evera 1998: 5). The democracy findings look even more encouraging: Fish and 
Brooks show ethnic heterogeneity does not make stable democracy less likely; 
Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich conclude from their data ‘no intrinsic antipathy exists 
between ethnopolitical diversity and democratic stability in Africa, or, for that matter, 
elsewhere’ (Fish and Brooks 2004: 154; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003: 389).  
2  The democratic domestic peace and democratization 
Why is democracy good for domestic peace? Democracies condone pluralism, accept 
diversity. They encourage contestation and competition. The line that borders conflict is 
a fine one, but conflict is not necessarily violent. Protests and demonstrations can be 
peaceful. Conflict can be the vehicle that enables much needed change. Without some 
conflict, democracy’s claim to a comparative advantage in the peaceful resolution of 
                                                 
1 This thesis on the cause of civil wars generally was advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 563-73). 
Subsequent elaborations suggest that greed is more central to the perpetuation of civil war.   4
conflict would not be so special. The idea behind a liberal democratic domestic peace is 
that its distinctive political modus operandi is singularly well-equipped to manage 
conflict, by placing a premium on negotiation and willingness to compromise. Liberal 
democracy respects human rights. That bestows a durable form of legitimacy on the 
system. It ensures government decisions are widely accepted even among the ‘losers’: 
where there is dissatisfaction, governments can be removed and yet political order is 
retained. These qualities are more solid than mere ‘performance legitimacy’ (the ability 
to deliver material needs of security and welfare), which a wide range of political 
regimes could exhibit but which might be sufficient to sustain a new democracy until 
society comes to appreciates its deeper, intrinsic political worth. 
 
Peace is not a sufficient condition for democracy; equally there is a threshold of 
conflict-reduction that societies must cross if they are to have any chance of building 
democracy: identifying the peace threshold and making it secure in practice may both 
be problematic. Hence the familiar problem of premature elections: when to stage 
elections that are supposed to end war, initiate ‘reconciliation’ and make transition to 
democracy, if the ‘security environment’ is not (yet) wholly favourable. 
 
And although democracy might make violence unnecessary it is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for domestic peace. On balance the evidence suggests that 
established democracies do perform better (less violent conflict) than autocracies, but in 
part this may be because autocracies tend to be less stable. Of course it could be argued 
that oppressive regimes should not even be viewed as a relevant comparator, where they 
inhibit sub-state violence by dint of instilling fear of the state and through 
intimidation—forms of violence in themselves. However, not all democracies are stable 
democracies; and attempts to build a democracy cannot guarantee political stability, 
especially after conflict in very poor countries. Needless to say the question whether 
there are any essential socio-economic requisites for stable democracy, and if so, what 
those requisites are, is prone to much dispute. India, Botswana, Mauritius and Costa 
Rica show that high average incomes are not essential for stable democracy. But 
Przeworski et al.’s estimate that democracy’s (but not autocracies’) survival will be 
guaranteed (only) after average per capita incomes have reached $6000 per annum is 
widely followed in the literature (Przeworski et al. 1996: 39-55). Needless to say that 
benchmark is well out of reach of many ‘post-conflict’ societies for whom the 
international community today recommends democracy. And in low income 
democracies political institutions ‘tend to have relatively high levels of instability, and 
this has probably tended to increase their risk of civil war’ (Collier et al. 2003: 65). 
 
If unstable democracy compares unfavourably with stable autocracy in preventing 
violent internal conflict, then comparative analysis identifies semi-democracy as the 
most challenging of all political environments for peace (Ellingsen 2000: 243; 
Mousseau 2001: 546-67; Regan and Henderson 2002: 119-36). Being more liberal than 
dictatorships, such intermediate regimes encourage dissent but are not responsive   5
enough to concede the substantive demands. So, subjects resort to unconstitutional 
channels and violent means, and governments respond with repression. Political change 
can compound the problem further. Movement by an intermediate regime towards 
democracy can look like a shift in the right direction—descending the right-hand side of 
the inverted U-curve that represents the statistical relationship between internal violence 
and level of democracy. It means progression in the direction of an outcome that might 
resemble the least conflict-prone type of regime—stable democracy. However, only 
rarely does the process of democratization occur smoothly and in linear fashion. And 
statistical analysis by Hegre et al. suggests flux makes such periods of change especially 
hazardous, liable to increase the risk of conflict; Mousseau too finds that autocratization 
is less risky than democratization, in ethnically heterogenous societies (Hegre et al. 
2001; Mousseau 2001). Specifically in these societies fragile new democracies’ 
effectiveness in preventing extreme forms of political violence compares unfavourably 
with the stable democracies. The complications that democratization can pose for the 
democratic peace theory in international relations are also noted by analysts whose 
particular interest is confined to the international domain.  
 
Statistical findings aside, several analysts have elaborated reasons why or how 
democratization might increase the risk of violent conflict. Huntington, in Political 
Order in Changing Societies (1968) first drew attention to the dangers inherent in 
pushing social mobilization ahead of economic development in the absence of well 
institutionalized political organizations (like a strong party system) to contain and 
channel popular demands. Such uneven processes of change invite ‘political decay’: 
political violence and military coups. He re-presented his concerns within the context of 
democracy’s ‘third wave’, arguing that amid the new freedoms there is a rational 
temptation for politicians in divided societies to exploit and accentuate cultural (race, 
ethnicity, language) cleavages for purposes of political mobilization. Identity will be 
(re)constructed and instrumentalized to the end of retaining/winning power, possibly 
even to the point of encouraging xenophobia—dangerous to peace at home and abroad. 
Examples include Kenya’s President Moi and Yugoslavia’s President Milosevic. Snyder 
too highlighted the risks posed by exclusionary ethno-nationalism fashioned and 
manipulated by competing by elites. Accordingly he recommends that democratic 
elections after conflict should await the development of a ‘thick safety net’ of ‘civic 
institutions’ such as an impartial media that will encourage cross-cutting political 
alignments (Huntington 1996: 3-13; Snyder 2000). 
 
So far, then, the inference both for post-conflict societies and the international 
community should be clear. The risks of internal violence provoked by political 
transition and the chances of eventually arriving at stable democracy must both be 
calculated carefully, and a view formed on what discount rate to apply to the possible 
future benefits, before pressing ahead with trying to democratize. These are areas of 
imperfect information and, more importantly, normative judgment; given that the   6
different actors will not have identical interests it would be surprising if there were not 
disagreements over strategy and the best way to proceed. 
3  (In)coherence in democratic peace-building: the policy implications  
A not untypical response to questions about what the international community should do 
in post-conflict situations is to say that what those societies need most is a holistic 
approach. That means addressing the whole gamut of social, economic and political 
problems, many of which will be closely interrelated. Related advice is to be prepared 
for a long haul. But such a potentially open-ended commitment backed by unlimited 
resources seems unrealistic, and at the very least needs justifying. For illustration there 
is Ottaway’s estimate that involvement in the DR Congo comparable to the support 
already provided in the ‘maximalist model’ of democratic construction employed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina would require 900,000 international peacekeepers and 
administrators—well in excess of the ‘bargain basement imperial solution’ presently on 
offer (Ottaway 2003: 318). What is more, not all good things may go together at the 
same time: sequencing issues could be just as significant as overall resource constraints. 
Agendas clash, priorities compete; trade-offs have to be considered, difficult choices 
made. Here the fashionable goal of ‘coherence’ in complex emergencies, where 
international humanitarian relief aid meshes harmoniously with a determination to end 
the violence, or at minimum ‘does no harm’, meets its post-conflict counterpart. The 
following discussion is structured around eight issue areas. 
3.1  Development for democracy 
Collier et al. identify marginalized low-income countries—even if they have long 
enjoyed peace and experienced elected government—and countries caught in the 
conflict trap (where there has already been civil war) as being at high risk of civil war. 
While disputes that fall along ethnic and religious lines might become more highly 
politicized and turn violent where incomes are low and declining, ‘the key root cause of 
conflict is failure of economic development’ (Collier et al. 2003: 53). The verdict is the 
international community must not only prioritize military peacekeeping, disarmament, 
troop demobilization and reintegration of former combatants but also provide adequate 
economic support. Failure to address the economic sources of conflict and its damaging 
economic consequences will make a recurrence more likely. Even if the violence does 
not return soon, continuing economic weakness would indirectly impair the 
democracy’s quality and threaten its sustainability. In contrast, by raising the price paid 
for political instability an improving economic outlook creates stakeholders in peace. 
That will shift the incentive structure towards political co-operation—even over 
democratic rules of the game. A prospering market economy makes political power less 
highly sought after simply as a passport to wealth.  
 
Here, at least, there is the possibility of a win-win situation, if attention to economic 
reconstruction both secures peace and underpins the democracy. However, if attempts to   7
install democracy founder and thereby fail to consolidate the peace then the prospects 
for development will suffer too. If the developmental impact of successful 
democratization itself is negative or very mixed then that too could endanger durable 
peace. And the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely that progress on development 
itself will be disruptive and create conflict, which might turn violent especially if the 
political institutions are weak or too rigid. This becomes more likely where rapid 
growth and technological change weaken established social bonds, and influential 
stakeholders find the distributive economic consequences (as they perceive them) 
unacceptable. To add to all these risks there is the statistical finding that violent conflict 
is more likely to emerge where there is a previous record. Both the chances of securing 
sound economic reconstruction and the implications for democracy, then, rest in part on 
other variables, most notably the health of the state. 
3.2  The state as a problem 
We live in an age that has discovered state failure and state collapse. They go together 
with conflict like ‘chicken and egg’. States can succumb to faulty design, inadequate 
resources and external aggression, with internal conflict playing no greater role than 
catalyst. The economic and social effects of HIV/AIDS will severely tax some states. In 
sultanistic regimes the leader’s demise automatically threatens the state. Conversely 
weak states with ineffective governments may persist without significant violence, or 
political violence brings down a government or transforms the regime but without 
assaulting the idea of statehood or eroding state capacity. A state’s ‘despotic power’ 
may wither yet its ‘infrastructural power’—the capacity to raise resources for 
development and meet the people’s needs—survives intact and, even, gains ground. 
 
Nevertheless there are post-conflict situations where creating a new state, or rebuilding 
a failed/ failing state and increasing its effectiveness is imperative to securing/ 
maintaining peace. In any case some measure of governance capability to implement the 
peoples’ wishes has to be present before their democratic entitlement to express policy 
preferences and choose between alternative programmes is to have real meaning. This 
does not mean the issue of regime type is irrelevant. Notwithstanding the rival appeal of 
hereditary monarchy, or theocracy, or ‘Asian values’, in many places regime legitimacy 
may be held contingent on whether the state is judged to be liberal democratic; and in 
the long run legitimacy itself contributes to state effectiveness.  
 
The key questions for policymakers then are what circumstances dictate that state 
(re)building take precedence over democratic transition, in the immediate term at least? 
And when, or at what point, can or should the emphasis switch? Of course the answers 
must refer back to the specific causes of a state’s failure and its consequences. For 
example giving priority to strengthening the state’s coercive powers hardly seems 
appropriate where the main problem has been one of state oppression. But where inter-
communal violence ran deep, the state’s reputational power to be able to hold all sides 
to agreements can be crucial to persuading everyone to lay down arms and negotiate.   8
Concentrating power over the means of physical coercion and centralizing power over 
other critical resources—the financial wherewithal to buy off troublemakers, for 
instance —could be high priorities. That means strengthening executive capacity and 
consolidating instruments of governance (although it may not mean statehood, as 
Kosovo illustrates). Wimmer and Schetter for instance argued these are what 
Afghanistan needs most (Wimmer and Schetter 2003: 525-39). 
 
In these circumstances fussing over institutional reforms to make government vertically 
and horizontally accountable (for example strengthening legislatures and judiciary 
respectively), promoting democratic decentralization and a high regard for democratic 
norms and practices can look like distractions. By creating opportunities for confusion 
and imposing delays they may postpone indefinitely the time when the authorities are 
able to organize national elections that command public confidence. A requirement to 
hold free and fair elections and invite alternations in power can easily complicate 
economic and state reconstruction. In contrast, the persistence of informal traditions of 
neo-patrimonialism and clientelism may usefully serve political stability in the interim, 
though anathema to the modern democratic state idea. Ottaway’s observation that the 
international community is overburdening some societies with its insistence on a 
‘democratic reconstruction model’—‘a set of prescriptions for state reconstruction that 
is so exhaustive that it cannot possibly be followed in practice’—makes the point 
(Ottaway 2002: 1008-9). Similarly for Fearon and Laitin the main way to prevent civil 
wars starting (again) is to have well-financed, administratively competent government 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
 
How much stability and what extent of state capability should be secured before the 
emphasis can turn to democratic transition? These go beyond simply technical matters 
like addressing fiscal crisis. Initial approaches that are weighted too heavily towards 
statist and governance considerations may in the longer run fall prey to path 
dependence, constraining future possibilities for democracy. Vested interests in 
perpetuating the initial power structure will gel, well placed to frustrate political 
redistribution later. Meaningful democratization is then delayed or watered down; a 
return to political violence (democratic revolution) might be required if democratic 
reform is to make headway later. Similar points can be made about choices over specific 
features of democracy’s institutional design when these are offered as ‘temporary’ 
concessions to bind reluctant parties into peace.  
3.3  The nation as a problem 
Nation-building poses challenges analytically distinct from state-building, though 
connections can be strong. Where a sense of national community is improbable it is 
unlikely that a strong state could be built and foolish to think that democratic transition 
would succeed. There may be circumstances where democracy, or democratization, can 
help build a nation. Various types of constitutional asymmetry (communal 
representation and territorial, regional or cultural autonomy) might help here, although   9
Ghai argues many such schemes emphasize conflict management at the expense of 
longer run democratic equality and governability, and Lane and Ersson too find 
federalism is not always positive for democratic stability (Ghai 2002; Lane and Ersson 
2005). There are places where the democratic self-determination of nations indicates 
that communities in conflict should be permitted to secede, such as where arbitrary 
boundaries are pure artefacts of history and do not ‘map on to’ distinct societies. The 
emergence of sovereign states like Eritrea and East Timor only after violent conflict 
(and after movement towards democracy, in Ethiopia and Indonesia) testify to the 
haphazard way decolonization was executed in the first place.  
 
However, if nation-based democracy points in one direction, the consequences for peace 
are not so clear-cut. One survey of 125 civil wars and 21 partitions since 1945 found 
partition is neither a necessary nor effective solution to ethnic civil war or lower levels 
of ethnic violence. It did not even confirm that partition is positive for democratization; 
on the contrary, in Africa democracy’s capacity to assuage grievance through 
recognizing political and civil rights was found to be more effective than partition 
(Sambanis 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). In practice the international 
community is generally averse to ‘balkanization’ (ironically the end of the cold war is 
often viewed as having increased the sub-state violence among former communist states 
and ‘third world’ quasi-states where governments lost their superpower support). The 
proliferation of states is seen as a recipe for international disorder. This aversion to 
conceding the democratic case for political self-determination in those places where it 
might seem overwhelming (Somaliland is a possible example) could invite a lose-lose-
lose situation—obstructive to state-building, to democracy, and to sustained peace. 
3.4 Electoral  timing 
Elections a democracy do not make; even so, the timing of the first ‘post-conflict’ 
elections can be especially problematic where they carry multiple responsibilities: set 
the seal on peace, begin a process of reconciliation, inaugurate transition to democracy, 
and produce a government. The difficulties facing policymakers are well known. Held 
too soon, and the security environment is hostile and the infrastructure of elections 
management not yet complete. The ‘moderate majority’ might need more time to 
organize, if dubious sectional groups led by military strongmen or warlords and with 
fewer collective action problems are not to prevail. The case of Liberia’s Charles Taylor 
in 1997 is paradigmatic. The election might set the seal on conflict but transition to 
democracy is improbable. The victor, claiming a democratic mandate proceeds to expel 
international peace monitors and democracy advisers. Where the electoral process is 
obviously flawed and the result contentious, elections may fuel violence, setting the 
scene for renewed general strife. Proposals to counter these fears include a broadly-
based interim electoral commission to foster collaboration. International backing might 
be valuable but should not hijack the process. Thus rather than concentrate on 
manufacturing structures to produce ‘free and fair’ elections external support should 
focus on fostering mechanisms that will change attitudes and expectations in the   10
direction of building confidence in peace (Lyon 2004). Transition elections that are 
given lavish assistance by international organizations can set a precedent that poor 
countries will be unable to repeat; inevitably subsequent elections are less well 
managed, and that may give the impression of democratic regression; the social capital 
then dwindles accordingly. 
 
Yet a protracted delay before the first elections means the persistence of some kind of 
rule that lacks basic legitimacy. It gives rise to suspicion over the true intentions, such 
as a partisan desire to determine the eventual outcome. As frustration grows the peace 
unravels. Where the peace negotiations embodied some post-election power-sharing 
deal the point of contestation can look obscure anyway; it makes voter indifference 
more likely—a bad start to democracy. So although representative democracy cannot be 
built without elections, elections held at the wrong time or under the wrong conditions 
undermine the chances of democratic transition, even if the authorities can summon 
enough military clout to limit political violence. Afghanistan and Iraq offer test cases. In 
worst case scenarios the peace process is sabotaged as well (Angola 1992). In contrast 
even a flawed election might secure the peace but at the same time electoral 
irregularities will set a bad precedent—repeated on future occasions (Nigeria). While 
strategies for democratization must pay attention to democracy’s enemies and not just 
its friends, in most cases of electoral malpractice the really troublesome—because least 
predictable —actors will be the semi-loyal. Identifying democracy’s ‘fair weather’ 
friends is a highly speculative business. 
3.5 Institutional  crafting 
Beyond the question of a post-conflict election’s timing lie bigger issues about a new 
democracy’s architecture, its institutional design. This includes the kind of executive 
and the extent of executive powers; executive-legislative relations; horizontal 
instruments of accountability (judiciary, ombudsperson, auditor-general); and of course 
the choice of electoral system. These are politically contentious issues. There are 
complex political science literatures about them even for societies free of conflict; post-
conflict situations sharpen the debates, without generating any greater consensus. 
Policymakers will look in vain for clear-cut and universally applicable solutions. 
 
Some of the disagreements go to the heart of different understandings of democracy and 
the relative importance attached to individual components, like accountability, 
participation, and inclusiveness. Some ideas of accountable government, checks and 
balances, and alternation in power (the last being critical to Huntington’s well-known 
‘double turnover’ test of democratic consolidation) incline towards an adversarial style 
politics, which may prove inflammatory in deeply divided societies. Presidential rule 
and the representational consequences of majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce 
clear lines of accountability, which has its merits. They also predispose towards 
‘winner-take-all’ situations, which were held responsible for the move to one-party rule 
and military coups in many post-colonial states and may be particularly unsuited to   11
polarized societies, where some form of proportional representation could be more 
appropriate. An institutional architecture that gives the losers in war or peace a stake in 
the democratic system will be at a premium. That means arrangements that can structure 
incentives in ways that deter political actors from cultivating the more divisive 
ethnonationalist agendas. One such proposal for inclusiveness is ‘vote-pooling’. This 
integrative approach presses politicians campaigning for office to draw support from 
across different communities, such as by making it mandatory to achieve some 
minimum threshold of support in every province (Nigeria). In fact the successful 
operation of multi-ethnic or broad alliance parties is common in the many 
heterogeneous African countries that have avoided violent conflict.  
 
Consociational proposals offer an alternative, which pushes party leaders to join 
coalitions—a form of group power-sharing—in order to form a government (a 
‘government of national unity’ even) after elections. The competing merits and 
limitations of these and other schemes are keenly contested.Thus it is said 
consociationalism provides no incentive to leaders to desist from mobilizing support on 
ethnic or other group lines. And it is a moot point whether consociationalism can 
establish confidence and build tolerance and trust, or performs well only where those 
properties are present already—which seems unlikely soon after conflict. The 
Netherlands’ Institute for Multiparty Democracy’s efforts to facilitate inter-party 
dialogue is an attractive model of what the international community can try to do in 
these situations. But perhaps even more damaging to consociationalism is the claim that 
it invites political paralysis—with negative consequences for governmental 
effectiveness that in turn may impact badly on peace. A parallel debate suggests that a 
strongly presidential system with a (no more than) two-party system, or possibly a 
parliamentary system like Britain’s, are more likely to provide stable, effective 
governance than is multipartyism combined with a weak form of presidentialism. 
Intermediate arrangements like semi-parliamentary and semi-presidential systems also 
have their own claimed advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Whichever institutional designs look most attractive in theory, achieving democratic 
ownership in practice can mean having to settle for a design that is sub-optimal for 
conflict-resolution (Horowitz 2002: 36).2 By the same token designs that successfully 
reconcile all main stakeholders to peace could well depart in some respects from the 
liberal democratic ideal. For instance a peace settlement that has to make explicit 
recognition of collective ethnonational rights such as by reserving a quota of seats in 
government could end up both impeding political integration and complicating the 
democracy’s operation, yet be extremely difficult to reverse or revise later. 
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3.6  Civil society issues 
If democratic design is one important influence on democratic prospects then the 
condition of civil society is another. There is much discussion of the concept itself and 
of civil society’s proper role and relationship to state, market and political society (in 
particular political parties), before, during, and after democratic transition. Views range 
widely. Civil societies themselves are nothing if not diverse: ‘civil society organizations 
are not inherently counterhegemonic or liberal’ (Hawthorne 2004: 11). Countries where 
associational groups have felt obliged to resort to coercive methods to oppose a 
dictatorship or where state failure has allowed ‘uncivil’ associations to expand or 
proliferate pose special difficulties for policymakers. 
 
Strong, effective democratic states and strong civil societies go together; but the civil 
society might have to reinvent itself first. An indiscriminate enthusiasm for 
associational life after violent conflict could jeopardize state building and guarantee 
future disorder. The concentration of support by the international democracy assistance 
industry on ‘civil society’ has tended to prefer ‘modern’ civil society—professionalized, 
non-governmental organizations, either policy advocacy/lobby groups or service-
providers that resemble western exemplars. It shows far less enthusiasm towards more 
‘traditional’ or informal groupings grounded in kinship or ethnic associations, clans, 
religious sects, and the wider fringe of social movements. Many of these will not be 
predisposed towards violence. But by ignoring them at this stage the international 
community risks allowing their more dangerous cousins to gain disproportionate 
political influence, especially where a negotiated end to violence has required—and 
promoted—their participation.  
 
When faced with an assortment of both civil and ‘uncivil’ associations policymakers 
must choose how to respond. Providing special assistance to very vulnerable groups like 
formerly oppressed minorities and associations whose express purpose is to build 
bridges across communities are the easy options. The promotion of politically ‘neutral’ 
policy issues might indirectly instigate the formation of new cross-cutting affiliations in 
civil society, environmental coalitions for example. But dealing with a legacy of 
dubious organizations poses more difficult dilemmas. Try to co-opt them? Convert 
them? Exclude them? Suppress them? Related conundrums are whether it is better to 
invest in capacity-building among chosen organizations and provide them with core 
support, or alternatively fund an ad hoc selection of activities, or instead concentrate on 
bringing about the right ‘enabling environment’ (legal and regulatory framework; tax 
inducements; media environment, and so on). Very similar considerations apply to 
support for the development of party politics, which is likely to become a growing area 
of international democracy promotion. In fact the early development of democratic 
parties and a viable party system might be essential if uncivil associational groups are 
not to occupy the political space. In divided societies it is not clearcut whether a 
fractionalized party system or a polarized system serves best to optimize the competing 
requirements of representativeness and integration/nation-building. Only to a limited   13
degree may the alternatives be susceptible to engineering via the particular choice of 
electoral system.  
 
The record of achievement to date of extensive efforts to assist civic organizations in 
societies where civil society was previously weak is modest. The major difficulties that 
externally-supported organizations experience in achieving autonomy and self-
sustainability have been extensively documented. It would be surprising if comparable 
difficulties are not encountered in the event of increased international support to the 
development of durable parties and effective party systems. Major policy issues include 
the limits of acceptable competition to discourage the deployment of racist or extreme 
nationalist agendas; the balance of public versus private funding of party activities; and 
how to translate party support into a stable, competitive party system that meets 
democracy’s main functional requirements.  
3.7 Justice  and  reconciliation 
Post-conflict societies are often much troubled by anxieties over how to deal with (bad 
memories of) the past. Liberal democracies should show an absolute commitment to 
fundamental human rights at all times, which makes the matter of ‘transitional justice’ a 
particularly delicate matter. ‘Faustian bargains’ and a promise of amnesties for ‘war 
criminals’ and gross abusers of human rights will be stronger incentives to co-operate in 
making peace than are threats of criminal prosecution. Peace objectives can vie with 
those of justice and the need for a new democratic government to demonstrate its firm 
commitment to the rule of law. Large-scale purges or lustration can deny the state 
essential human skills. Yet facing up to the past may be essential to reconciliation and to 
the possibility of achieving normal democratic life in the long run. Similarly, finding a 
solution to the proper requirement of judicial autonomy without seeming to vest too 
much political power in a democratically unaccountable institution is another puzzle 
that will demand attention. 
3.8  Political culture and political economy 
Many analysts believe the popular political culture (values, attitudes, beliefs, and 
affections) is critical to the success of democratization, especially democratic 
consolidation and democratic deepening, although less important to the overthrowing of 
an authoritarian regime and the immediate aftermath. Yet the discourse on conflict and 
peace makes little reference to political culture. An unhelpful exception are theorists 
who claim violence is rooted in atavism, that ethnic conflict stems from primordial 
sentiments rather than from say colonial ‘divide and rule policies’ or the past attempts 
of cold war warriors to destabilize allies of their opponents in the developing world. 
Nowadays, ethnic groups themselves are widely understood to be historical products, 
formed by processes of administrative classification, political mobilization, and 
socialization. Although the likelihood of conflict might be influenced by their relative 
displacement and distribution, the malleability of political culture offers the potential to   14
influence the prospects for democratic peace: key issues here involve who must be 
influenced, how to influence, and how long will it take. 
 
Where efforts to make peace rest heavily on elite-level bargains between the leaders of 
the groups, bands or communities formerly at war, the question of popular culture 
barely seems to arise. The willingness of people to follow their leaders counts, 
obviously. However, for democratic sustainability in the long run—namely, where the 
political culture of the demos can be counted on both to underpin responsible political 
participation and to protect democracy’s institutions from subversion by self-seeking 
political rogues— the challenge of popular political culture must be addressed. One way 
of phrasing what needs to be done is the development of a ‘moderate majority’—
citizens who are prepared to stand up and be counted for democracy. To reach that point 
could well require far more wide-ranging measures of political investment than simply 
voter education campaigns geared to navigating citizens through the practicalities of 
first generation elections. Progress may be slow; irreversibility is not guaranteed.  
 
Moreover an elite-level approach to peacemaking/peace maintenance hardly seems to 
cohere with the normative case for a mass–level approach to building democracy. 
Democracy crafting in any situation invites choices between more elitist and more 
popular approaches; it is reasonable to expect the final decisions will reflect the existing 
—usually unequal—distribution of power. The choice of electoral rules is one example; 
it is an arena of political contestation that may have greater significance than—because 
it sets the context for—subsequent competitions among parties for the people’s vote. 
Mass engagement with the decision process might seem unhelpful, or premature, at this 
stage, and even dangerous to peace. But the consequence of adopting a more elitist or 
technocratic approach could be a democracy that resembles Joseph Schumpeter’s (1943) 
well-known—and much criticized—model: an arrangement for arriving at decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people's vote. The consequences are writ large in the example of the EU. The 
current indifference of the European public to elections to the European Parliament can 
be said to originate in the early stages of post-1945 European integration, when the 
citizenry was excluded from a process designed primarily to create an elite political 
consensus.  
 
A minimalist, procedurally-oriented democracy hardly delivers the democratic peace 
dividend envisaged by proponents of participatory democracy and social democracy let 
alone fulfil aspirations to ‘empowerment’. Grass-roots activists who fought against the 
ancien regime might feel cheated; even peaceful converts to the idea of liberal 
democracy might feel disappointed. Indeed, although Bastian and Luckham concluded 
that democracy’s institutional design really does influence the extent to which 
democracy eliminates violent conflict, they also recommend more attention be given to 
the ways democratic institutions can acquire legitimacy. For them, the secret lies in 
enhancing participation, or a ‘democratic politics’  (Bastian and Luckham 2003).   15
Democratic politics requires that all citizens are aware of their opportunity to 
participate. That can mean resisting the pressures to weight post-conflict structures in 
the direction of the very actors whose agreement to end conflict was most essential to 
achieving peace. Such structures could all too easily freeze the map of power, to the 
disadvantage of political interests and political formations that (can) emerge or develop 
only in the settled conditions of peace. Moreover the conditions for such enhanced 
participation go beyond just political inclusion for all: social and economic inclusion 
could be essential too. Particular concern should be paid to gender equality, if necessary 
through affirmative action measures (women being among violent conflict’s victims, 
they are often marginalized in the political manoeuvrings after conflict).  
 
All this has special resonance where the international community is providing 
substantial humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction aid as part of a strategy 
to build peace. Policy should not allow local powerbrokers to control the disbursements 
in ways that serve to intensify the politicization of difference between communities or 
obstruct the (re)building of vital state capacity, or reinforce elite (male) domination of 
political life. Only the specifics of the country’s political as well as economic situation 
can determine whether the market or public sector bodies or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are the most appropriate vehicles for disbursing aid. 
Considerations of efficiency and financial accountancy should not be considered as 
‘trumps’; even less so a commitment to principles of economic liberalization and 
privatization if an insistence on marketization or NGO-ization would seriously weaken 
an already fragile state. In deeply divided societies group-based (mis)perceptions of 
unequal or unfair patterns in the distribution of economic opportunities can have 
negative consequences for both peace and democracy. So even if the politics of deal-
making that establishes peace require the negotiations to be conducted behind closed 
doors, the case for transparency in the arrangements for distributing international 
material assistance in these situations is strong. 
4  The limits and responsibilities of international intervention 
4.1 Limits 
Some conflicts are brought to an end decisively, for instance where the oppressors 
triumph over rebels or alternatively are completely vanquished, or where all the parties 
to civil war are exhausted (Mozambique). The way peace arrives may both affect its 
durability and influence the democratic prospects near by (for example the post-civil 
war creation of Bangladesh in 1971 established electoral democracy there and also 
returned Pakistan to democracy). But if there are difficult choices over what should 
happen next so there are questions over who should or can do what. The United Nations 
Charter gives the international community legal authority to use force to intervene when 
the Security Council judges that a state poses a threat to the peace of neighbours. But it 
mentions no right to forcibly impose democracy, in any circumstances. The act of   16
intervening to impose peace, or the means employed, can disable the intervenors from 
playing a constructive role in building democracy, where for example local stakeholders 
interpret forcible intervention as a hostile act against the country or as politically 
partisan. The primary question will then be not what contribution the foreign actors can 
make to confidence-building between communities formerly at war, but how much 
confidence those actors can command when offering their ‘good offices’ to 
deliberations over the new democratic architecture. The role of the USA in Middle East 
diplomacy is made more difficult by issues such as these.  
 
In democracies the people are supposed to be sovereign. And a common notion is that 
democratization must come from within, not gifted from without. Possibly a truism it is 
also a practical observation, for unlike a truce, which can be imposed, democracy must 
be owned by the people. Their involvement in the political process is essential. Only 
then can the political arrangements secure a lasting legitimacy. This condition has yet to 
be fulfilled in Bosnia-Herzegovina for example, notwithstanding, or possibly because 
of, very extensive political management of the local situation by outside agencies. 
Critics claim democracy there is being redefined as adherence to externally set 
standards and imposed decisions—very different from autonomy and domestic 
accountability or locally-rooted processes involving accommodations reached freely 
between the different groups. ‘If the international community is deciding which parties 
represent the public interest and which policies they should be implementing then there 
is little room for political contestation or for democratic involvement’ (Chandler 2002: 
115). Either democracies cannot be imposed or, as has often been the case, the outcome 
proves politically unstable. The few exceptions like West Germany and Japan after 
1945 are very special cases, from which we should not generalize. Constitutional 
advisers face similar conundrums when they ‘must consider not only whether a 
particular institutional design is attractive for a given polity but also whether the 
transitional environment makes it likely that the given design will be adopted’ (Solnick 
2002: 205).  
 
Yet clearly there are also circumstances of international intervention that can be helpful 
to the prospects for democratic transition, as well as for peace. Thus it matters whether 
it is UN-sanctioned and in accordance with the UN Charter, and if the execution has a 
multinational flavour. Making war on a country in order to build democracy might 
sound counter-intuitive. But an international presence by creating windows of peace 
may enable a society to take steps towards democracy, such as by defending it against 
external aggression (as in East Timor) or from the contagion of a bad neighbourhood, as 
in parts of West Africa. Sometimes it is there by invitation (Sierra Leone); and in places 
like Afghanistan and Iraq where uninvited external agency destroyed a regime there is a 
moral obligation to contribute constructively to building a replacement.  
 
The idea of democratic self-determination suggests that an external presence should 
leave the scene as soon as possible after conflict, unless its continued assistance is freely   17
accepted. In principle conflict can be brought to an end rapidly by the use of superior 
force, especially when wielded by external actors who do not have to account to the 
people, although there have been places where maintaining the peace involved a long-
term commitment (Cyprus). In practice closure may not be so swift. And at minimum 
the international community might have to signal an intention to enforce the peace for 
‘as long as it takes’, if all the former combatants in civil strife are to be persuaded that 
from now on peaceful political methods really are the ‘only game in town’, As a last 
resort for peace the imposition of international trusteeship might be one—seemingly 
undemocratic—option, but Articles 77 and 78 of the UN Charter seem to disallow that 
for UN member states. Imposed trusteeship would then be beyond the international rule 
of law; if, however, trusteeship was the democratically expressed wish of the people, 
then it seems unlikely they would need it.  
 
Pressure on international peacekeepers to withdraw too soon, owing to financial 
constraints or political pressure at home (an impending election for example) can mean 
their democracy puts obstacles in the way of successful peace-building. Likewise it 
might frustrate transition to democracy either because that needs peace or it requires 
significant long-term support in its own right. If international actors outstay their 
welcome that in itself may provoke new manifestations of violence, as they become 
targets. But for many of the post-conflict societies democratization is so novel and 
daunting that international assistance of one kind or another, direct and indirect, could 
be essential for many years to come. Thus whereas international peace-makers are 
usually on the look-out for an exit strategy (aiming to quit after new elections have been 
held), in the circumstances of democratic peace-building a more relevant outlook for 
international actors might be a ‘completion strategy’, While peace-makers look back, 
seeking signs that the glass of peace is increasingly full, democracy builders dwell on 
the task ahead and with good reason might conclude that their glass is still 
uncomfortably close to empty. Yet there are no scientifically-based criteria to tell us 
when the foundational work of political reconstruction is complete. That makes it 
difficult to establish precisely when the international community’s share of 
responsibilities for building democracy can or should come to an end. 
4.2 Responsibilities 
Peace and democracy may both be described as public goods, but international actors 
are no different from domestic actors in that the values they place on them will be 
influenced by more purely self-regarding interests. The degree to which international 
actors privilege efforts to strengthen state capacity, or, say, assist economic 
improvement, over building democracy, will depend on their reasons for involvement—
the foreign policy drivers and on policy analysis. In this way debates over the primary 
cause of threats to international security (international conflict) mirror debates over sub-
state violence. For example does the problem lie with domestic political 
oppression/illiberal regimes, or with state weakness (both may reflect a poor fit between 
nation and state)? Or is the main cause poverty and a sense of (global) social injustice,   18
or alternatively some specific political grievance (like the Palestinian cause), or 
religious  jihad? As with policymakers’ precise choices of time horizons when 
formulating their action plans, different answers and responses will be suggested by the 
way a problem is defined and by how the causes are understood. This is as true in post-
conflict situations as when international actors reflect on what pre-emptive action (if 
any) to take ahead of a possible slide towards domestic conflict. At present, confusion 
over these issues reigns in the West and inside the USA administration specifically. In 
the coming years responses are likely to be impacted by other changes in the 
international context. Will the UN acquire greater powers? If the world acquiesces in 
the idea of unilateral and pre-emptive military intervention in the name of national 
security, or gives permanent political status to illegal occupation (in the West Bank), 
then what will be the implications for the (international) rule of law?  
 
In all of this the democracy promoters should remember that liberal democracy is not a 
solution to every political problem, at home or abroad. The persistence of intense 
desires for self-determination by distinct communities within multinational societies 
like the UK, Canada and Spain is evidence. A world of democracies may not address 
more insistent demands from the world’s poor for global social equity. Potential new 
sources of violent conflict like environmental catastrophe (‘water wars’ in the Middle 
East for instance) may require solutions beyond democracy’s toolkit. And right now in 
‘advanced democracies’ some erosion of liberties appears an accepted price for 
measures to counter terrorism. However, if democracy is a prize worth having, and not 
least because it can serve a range of primary values other than peace (or prosperity 
even), then the case for the international community to promote democratization applies 
almost anywhere, irrespective of whether there has been conflict. Demand (need) 
outstrips supply (international offers of support). In that case the democracy promotion 
actors must assess the respective chances of achieving success. Do post-conflict 
situations make the democratization challenge easier or is success less probable than in 
more orderly societies that have a functioning economy but authoritarian rulers oppose 
political change? How can we compare the prospective returns on the political 
investment in democracy promotion in such dissimilar situations as say Liberia and 
North Korea today? Even outside the conflict zones building democracy and its political 
conditions is likely to be a long haul, for any society that has yet to engage in 
democratic transition or so far has made only a few false starts.  
 
So the substantive contribution the international community can make to 
democratization and the precise modalities will depend on the society’s political 
configuration and the political inheritance it brings from the past. The nature of the 
previous regime will shape opportunities, needs and constraints. This is yet another 
reason why not all post-conflict societies are the same. In countries where a version of 
democracy has already been tried before, it is important to establish whether that 
experience was responsible for the outbreak of violent conflict or whether the conflict 
occurred only because democracy had failed. New strategies for peace and democracy   19
should be adapted accordingly. It can mean much more than ‘doing democracy 
projects’—support for elections, parties, civil associations and the like—and much more 
than attaching democracy conditionalities to financial and economic aid. In Europe’s 
transition economies the goal of accession to the European Union has of course 
provided a major inducement to rapid political reform. But in other regions too trade 
and financial concessions can form part of the package of persuasion, as in the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development.  
 
Anyone seeking to build liberal democracy especially after civil war must attend to the 
‘deep politics of society’ (Bastian and Luckham: 2003) as well as the ‘high politics’ of 
state. They must ‘address issues of both economic growth and social justice as probable 
necessary conditions’ (Barnes 2001: 87). Sustained economic development can make 
violent conflict less likely (without eliminating it completely. Israel and Ulster are no 
strangers to political violence while surpassing Przeworski’s income benchmark for 
impregnable democracy. The same applies on a purchasing power parity basis to several 
other countries including Russia). And there is much evidence from developing 
countries (but not necessarily supported in all advanced economies) for the rather 
different proposition that wide socio-economic inequality harms democracy. In low-
income countries, then, pro-poor development improves the chances of sustaining a 
democracy even if passing the Przeworski benchmark does not guarantee that society 
will actually choose democracy, certainly not liberal democracy (which Singapore is 
not), let alone bring all political violence to an end. 
 
However, given that democracy, or democratization, may not provide the most 
favourable political environment for economic progress except perhaps in the long run 
and when the democracy is liberal and stable (which could mean that favourable 
average income levels have already been attained), the message to the international 
community is unmistakable. Failure to underpin democratization with essential 
economic support in the early days could rob the political transition of performance 
legitimacy at a very vulnerable time, and place everything at risk. In the absence of 
political stabilization the return of violent conflict would become more likely. So for 
example imposing aid sanctions in response to a fragile new democracy’s failure to 
comply fully with economic and financial policy conditions—as happened to Haiti’s 
elected President Aristide (2004)—could be very short-sighted. In fact there is a very 
strong case for assessing the impact on democracy of all forms of aid intervention and 
not just of democracy aid.3 Externally imposed conditionalities may be an affront to 
democracy anyway, where they undercut the ability of elected government to respond to 
the voters’ preferences and override their political entitlement to hold it to account. On 
the face of it the case for ‘positive conditionalities’ (incentives) looks more compelling 
than for ‘negative conditionalities’ (penalties). However, for aid to become a more 
effective instrument for promoting democratic progress at all, substantial real budgetary 
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increases will be required. The irony is that aid budgets were reducing throughout the 
1990s just as the international community’s interest in promoting democracy was 
increasing. 
 
The all-round resourcing implications of a serious commitment to democracy promotion 
seen against the background of the special demands of peace-building makes a 
compelling case for considering global strategy in a more optimal way. That means 
more than simply establishing a permanent, dedicated UN agency for (democratic) 
state-building.4 A rational advance could be to empowering a distinct institutional site 
to assemble a collective memory of democratic peace-building, even if every new post-
conflict situation differs somewhat from the last and produces some new problems.5 But 
just as important is improved coordination among the various state and non-state 
actors—national and international—operating either side of the line dividing the peace 
and democracy ‘industries’. Once again Bosnia stands out: many studies mention the 
parallel involvement of multiple international organizations as a textbook case of how 
not to proceed, notwithstanding the maintenance of peace.  
 
The main findings about international democracy assistance to date raise even larger 
issues than that. Certainly, methodologies for ex post evaluation of democracy 
assistance even in peaceful situations are at best embryonic and contentious. Project or 
programme input is easier to measure than output, but neither compare with the 
difficulties of assessing the wider impact on democracy. By comparison evaluating 
democracy promotion efforts in post-conflict situations—characterized by multiple 
goals and exaggerated expectations—suggests a Herculean task. That said, some of the 
overarching lessons from democracy assistance to date have relevance. First, it works 
best where the tide is running in the right direction anyway, which is where the 
necessity for assistance is least obvious. It is likely that a movement away from the 
employment of political conditionalities for aid and towards greater selectivity in 
allocating democracy aid—akin to what some economists propose for the allocation of 
official development assistance—would serve to compound that tendency. Post-conflict 
societies where the (successful) struggle was primarily about introducing democracy 
would be among the ‘winners’; societies where other issues defined the violence and the 
conflict has failed to generate a widespread commitment to democracy would be 
‘losers’. Is that an acceptable result? 
 
The second lesson is that the international community should focus less on trying to 
reproduce specific (democratic) institutional models—that might be ethnocentric—and 
reflect further about the routes by which genuine democratic advance might be 
achieved. Put differently, pay more attention to process and less to grand designs. The 
                                                 
4 Something commentators have looked for in vain ever since UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros 
Ghali wrote his An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (1992). 
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point applies not only to democratization—a process that could depend on (non-violent) 
conflict—but to state-building too (see Ottaway 2003). 
5 Conclusion 
Widely held assumptions about post-conflict situations make peace-building and 
democratization virtually synonymous or mutually supportive. But the reality can be 
different. Violent conflict often occurs on new democracy’s watch. This owes less to the 
limitations of the democratic ideal than to choices concerning the degree and kind of 
democracy and its institutional design; the process of democratization and how it is 
being promoted—including the nature of any international involvement—may also be 
very influential here. Choices may have to be addressed between requisites for peace 
and conditions for democracy. Policy must consider both the implications for 
democracy of different approaches to peace, and the different implications for peace of 
alternative ideas for democracy. It must take account of other essential political 
developments such as state-strengthening too. There are temporal choices and issues of 
sequencing. One possibility is that stable democracy lies far out of reach for an 
immediate post-conflict situation; but no less worrying, a resort to second best solutions 
in the interim could have constraining consequences for the democratic prospects in the 
longer term. 
 
Violent conflict is an aberration. In theory sound institutional crafting is a helpful 
preventative; in practice it is no ‘silver bullet’. Advisers should identify closely what it 
is about democracy (a promise of accountability; good governance; inclusiveness; 
political equality; security for minority rights; and so on) that could contribute most to 
preventing the recurrence of violent conflict in the society in question. And then tailor 
recommendations to the society in question: sound institutional choices will be context-
specific. Democratic sustainability, effective governance, and sound economic 
management as well as the potential to manage conflicts peaceably can all invoke 
different institutional solutions. Designing democratic states is but an art, not a science; 
political science provides no straightforward policy consensus; many uncertainties exist 
on the ground.  
 
Indeed, in the light of their case study findings Bastian and Luckham (2003: 314) felt 
tempted to suggest an ‘iron law of the perverse consequences of institutional design’ 
(Bastian and Luckham 2003: 314). In fact specialists from different branches of 
institutional politics ranging from electoral systems to constitutional asymmetries offer 
the view that complex arrangements and a willingness to engage in continual tinkering 
can both disappoint. This does not mean institutions do not matter; on the contrary, two 
contrasting signals are being sent to democratic peace-builders. First, foreswear 
excessive confidence in institutional solutions, especially very sophisticated ones; and 
notwithstanding the above, aim to get it right for democracy first time—do not count on   22
it coming good later. Inter alia that means institutionalizing respect for the rule of law 
no less than installing democracy’s more mundane electoral procedures.  
 
The consolidation of liberal democracy is not an inevitable outcome of political 
transition or of democratic transition. A new democracy’s ability to manage political 
conflict may not tackle the underlying conditions that determine whether violent 
conflict will reoccur and proceed to put the new democracy in peril. If democratization 
is a correct response to violence then that means addressing such matters as civil society 
and political culture too. But democratization ‘constitutes only one component of an 
effective preventive strategy’ towards conflict (Sandbrook 2002: 151). issues relating to 
effective governance and economic welfare could be at least as important. For the 
international community to figure out how to advance the cause of liberal democracy 
and then put the knowledge into practice has proven difficult enough, even in situations 
unburdened by a history of violent conflict. And even in those cases some significant 
trade-offs are only to be expected; notable choices have to be made. Any country’s 
political absorptive capacity for international democracy assistance will be limited at a 
particular time, no matter how settled the social and political order. But the choices and 
trade-offs are sharper in ‘post-conflict’ situations, where the effects of conflict and 
peacemaking/peace-building demand serious attention too. Democracy is neither a one-
stop shop nor a guaranteed cure. 
 
The UNDP’s 2002 Human Development Report reasons that democracies are superior 
to non-democracies at managing domestic conflict in ways that do not harm economic 
performance. It is indeed a happy conclusion that peace, prosperity and democracy 
could go together. The theoretical claim that the democratic peace thesis in international 
relations has its complement in a democratic domestic peace still looks plausible. But 
‘getting there’ after conflict will be very challenging, especially for societies where all 
three qualities—peace, prosperity and democracy—have been noticeably deficient. 
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